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This research examines whether teacher licensure test scores and other teacher 
qualifications affect high school student achievement.  The results are based on 
longitudinal student-level data from Los Angeles.  The achievement analysis uses a 
value-added approach that adjusts for both student and teacher fixed effects.  The results 
show little relationship between traditional measures of teacher quality (e.g., experience 
and education level) and student achievement in English Language Arts (ELA) or math.  
Similarly, teacher aptitude and subject-matter knowledge, as measured on state licensure 
tests, have no significant effects on student achievement. Achievement outcomes differ 
substantially from teacher to teacher, however, and the effects of a good ELA or math 
teacher spillover from one subject to the other.   
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A major concern for educators and policymakers is the low high school 
graduation rates and weak preparation of high school graduates for postsecondary 
education and careers. Greene and Forester (2003) show that only 70 percent of public 
high school students graduate on time and only 32 percent of these graduates have 
sufficient high school course preparation to attend four-year colleges. The situation is 
even worse for minority students, with only 50 percent of Black and Hispanic students 
graduating from high school on time and only about 18 percent of these students 
qualifying to attend four-year colleges.  
Many high school completers are not proficient in basic academic skills needed 
for postsecondary education and careers. The percentage of twelfth-grade students at or 
above proficiency levels is only 36 in reading, 26 in writing, 16 in mathematics, and 18 in 
science (National, 2007). About 42 and 30 percent of freshman at four- and two-year 
colleges, respectively, take remedial classes (Martorell and McFarlin, 2007). Moreover, 
students fall behind in college as they complete remedial classes, and this delay and the 
additional enrollment cost associated with it are a major reason for many students to drop 
out (Venezia et al., 2003). 
A major goal of education policy has been to leverage better student outcomes 
through improvements in the teacher workforce. In 1998, the Title II (Teacher Quality 
Enhancement Grants for States and Partnerships) legislation encouraged states to institute 
mandated teacher testing as part of initial state teacher certification. The No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 required a “highly qualified teacher” in all classrooms and 
public reporting of teacher qualifications.  
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This research focuses on how differences in high school teacher qualifications 
affect classroom performance. We examine differences in student achievement from 
teacher to teacher and assess whether some types of teachers have consistently better 
success in the classroom. In addition to traditional measures of teacher quality like 
experience and educational background, we measure whether general teacher aptitude or 
subject matter expertise (as measured on teacher licensure tests) are linked with better 
student achievement outcomes in the classroom.  
The analysis relies on longitudinal data from the Los Angeles Unified School 
District (LAUSD). LAUSD is the 2nd largest school district in the United States with 
enrollment of about 700,000 students per year. We track student achievement for eight 
years and have student records linked to individual teachers. The dataset includes records 
for about 150,000 high school students per year in about 120 high schools. We focus on 
English Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics teachers, since students take achievement 
tests in these subjects each spring. LAUSD high schools employ about 2600 ELA and 
1700 math teachers per year.  
This study addresses the following research questions: 
1. How does the distribution of teacher quality vary across high schools? A 
common concern is that at-risk minority students from low socioeconomic 
families are matched with poorly qualified teachers (Lankford et al., 2002; 
Murnane and Steele, 2007). In this paper, we study to what extend this is the 
case or if on the contrary good qualified teachers are found across schools of 
different composition.  
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2. How important are traditional measures of teacher quality like experience and 
educational level in predicting high school student achievement? In earlier 
research (Buddin and Zamarro, 2009a; Buddin and Zamarro, 2009b), we 
found that these measures had little effect on student achievement in 
elementary or middle school. High school instruction is more specialized, so 
more experienced or better educated teachers may have better student gains 
than other teachers. 
3. Are teachers with higher general aptitude or more subject-matter expertise, as 
measured on teacher licensure tests, more successful improving student 
achievement than other teachers? The conventional wisdom is that high school 
teachers would perform better if they had a strong subject area background 
(National, 2004).  
4. Does ELA instruction spill over into math and visa versa? For example, we 
will examine whether ELA teachers have an indirect effect on math 
achievement even after controlling for a student’s math teachers. A “good” 
teacher in one subject may improve student engagement and learning in other 
subjects as well. 
We structure the rest of the paper in the following way. Section 2 reviews prior 
literature on teacher quality and licensure test scores emphasizing the research on high 
school student achievement. Section 3 describes the data set and econometric methods 
used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results. The final section draws 
conclusions and makes policy recommendations.  
2. Prior Literature  
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Teacher quality research has become increasingly sophisticated over the past 
twenty years as data quality has improved. Initial studies relied on cross sectional data 
that were often aggregated at the level of schools or even school districts (Hanushek, 
1986). This approach related average school test scores to aggregate measures of teacher 
proficiency. Hanushek (1986) showed that most explicit measures of teacher 
qualifications like experience and education had little effect on student achievement. 
In the 1990’s, several studies looked at teacher quality issues using nationally 
representative samples of high school students. These studies examined whether gains in 
student achievement during high school were related to differences in the characteristics 
of their teachers. Ehrenberg and Brewer (1995) found that the teacher test scores on a 
verbal aptitude test were associated with higher gains in student scores although the 
results varied by school level and students’ racial/ethnic status. Similarly, Rowan et al. 
(1997) found that teachers’ responses to a one-item measure of mathematics knowledge 
were positively and significantly related to students’ performance in mathematics, 
suggesting that teacher scores on subject matter tests may relate to student achievement 
as well.  
In the past decade, several studies (Rivikin et al., 2005; Boyd et al., 2006; Harris 
and Sass, 2006; Clotfelter et al., 2007; Goldhaber, 2007; Koedel & Betts, 2007) have 
estimated teacher effectiveness using student administrative data, but most have focused 
on elementary school students. A common theme across many of these studies is that 
students consistently do much better with some teachers than with others, but student 
achievement varies little with the observed characteristics of teachers. New teachers have 
more difficulties than experienced teachers, but the experience effect generally dissipates 
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after the first few years of teaching. Most teacher characteristics and qualifications have 
little effect on student achievement, i.e., those factors that are statistically significant 
generally have effect sizes of around 0.02 to 0.04. However, few studies include teacher 
licensure scores in their analysis. Exceptions are Clotfelter et al. (2007) and Goldhaber 
(2007) who found small positive effects of licensure scores on student achievement.  
In our prior work (Buddin and Zamarro, 2009a; Buddin and Zamarro, 2009b), we 
find that teacher qualifications have little effect on student achievement of elementary 
and middle school students in LAUSD. We also find that measures of teacher aptitude, 
pedagogy knowledge, and subject-matter expertise are unrelated to student achievement 
for these students.    
Few recent studies have examined how teacher quality affects high school student 
achievement. Aaronson et al. (2008) looks at teacher quality and student achievement in 
Chicago public high schools.  The study looks at test score gains between 8th and 9th 
grades with controls for teacher fixed effects.  The results show strong effects of teachers 
on student achievement with an effect size of about 0.20, but traditional measures of 
teacher qualifications like education, experience, and credential type have little effect on 
classroom results. 
Koedel (2009) also used a fixed effects approach to look at student achievement 
for students in grades 8 through 11. He focuses on a standardized reading test given to all 
students at the completion of each grade. A novel feature of his approach is the control 
for possible spillover effects on student achievement from math, science, and social 
science teachers as well as the students reading (English) teacher. He finds large 
differences in student achievement across reading teachers, i.e., some teachers have 
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consistently larger improvements in their classroom than others. In addition, he finds that 
indirect spillover effects from math teachers are nearly as important as those of the direct 
effect on reading achievement from the reading teacher.  
Clotfelter et al. (2008) use a cross-subject fixed effects approach to estimate how 
teacher quality affects high school student achievement. These authors use North 
Carolina data where high school students are not tested in the same subject in successive 
years, but they are tested in different subjects instead (algebra; economic, legal, and 
political systems; English I, geometry, and biology) during 9th and 10th grades. As in 
most value-added studies of teacher quality the authors use fixed effects to control for 
persistent student characteristics with the additional assumption that general ability is 
fixed across subjects for each student. Then the authors compare how teacher 
qualifications affect student achievement conditional on each grade and subject. As in the 
other studies described below, they find that teacher experience matters only for new 
teachers and teacher education had no effect on achievement. Teacher licensure scores 
are found to be positively related with achievement, but their effect size is small (about 
0.03).  
3. Econometric Methods and Data 
Modeling Issues 
An education production function is the underlying basis for nearly all recent 
studies of student achievement. These modeling approaches link the current student 
achievement level to current family, teacher, and school inputs as well as to inputs 
provided in previous time periods. Following Todd and Wolpin (2003), let Tit be the test 
score measure of student i that is observed in year t and it be a measurement error, and 
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let Xit and it represent observed and unobserved inputs for student i at time t. Finally, let 
i0 be the student’s endowed ability that does not vary over time. Assume that the 
cognitive production function is linear in the inputs and in the unobserved endowment 
and that input effects do not depend on the child’s age but may depend on the age at 
which they were applied relative to the current age. Then, a general cognitive production 
function will be given by: 
 Tit = i0 + 1Xi t+ 2Xit-1 + …+ 1i t+ 2it-1 +…+ it (1)
 
where test scores in a given year are a function of current and past observed and 
unobserved inputs as well as of the initial ability of the child.  
Estimation of Equation 1 requires a comprehensive history of all past and present 
family and school/teacher inputs as well as information about each student’s endowed 
ability. Several empirical problems complicate the estimation of this complete, ideal 
model:  
 Endowed ability (i0) or some student inputs are not observed, and observed 
student inputs maybe chosen endogenously with respect to them (student 
unobserved heterogeneity). For example, English learner status (an observed 
variable) may be correlated with family wealth (an unobserved variable). If so, the 
estimated effect of English learner status may reflect the underlying wealth effect 
in addition to the direct effect of being an English learner.  
 Data sets on teacher inputs are incomplete, and observed teacher inputs maybe 
chosen endogenously with respect to the unobserved teacher inputs (teacher 
unobserved heterogeneity). For example, teacher effort may be difficult to 
measure, and effort might be related to measured teacher qualifications, i.e., 
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teachers with higher licensure test scores may regress to the mean with lower 
effort. 
 Students and teachers are not allocated randomly into schools or classrooms. 
Families with higher preferences for schooling will try to allocate their children in 
better schools or classrooms, principals may not allocate teachers to classrooms 
randomly, and good teachers may have more negotiation power to locate 
themselves into schools or classrooms with higher achieving students. These 
choices will lead to endogeneity of observed inputs with respect to unobserved 
student and teacher inputs or endowments.  
Different specifications have been proposed in the most recent literature to try to 
overcome previous data limitations. 
In this paper, we estimate a dynamic panel data model that includes student and 
teacher fixed effects in the following reduced form: 
 
it it 1 0 it 1 i j i j itY  Y +x  u  q             (2)
 
where itY  is either the English Language Arts (ELA) or math test score of the student i in 
year t; itx  are time-variant individual observable characteristics (classroom 
characteristics); iu  are time-invariant individual observable characteristics (gender, race, 
parent’s education, special attitudes and needs); and jq  are time-invariant observable 
characteristics of the jth teacher (gender, licensure test scores, education, experience). We 
estimate the model with direct teacher effects (e.g., including math teacher fixed effects 
on the math achievement equation) and with both direct and indirect effects (e.g., 
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including both math and ELA teacher fixed effects on the math achievement equation). 
Finally, it contains individual and teacher time variant unobserved characteristics.1,2 
Both teachers and students enter and exit the panel so, we have an unbalanced 
panel. Students also change teachers (generally from year to year). This is crucial, 
because fixed effects are identified only by the students who change teachers. It is 
assumed that it is strictly exogenous. That is, student's assignments to teachers are 
independent of it . Note, according to this assumption, assignment of students to teachers 
may be a function of the observables and the time-invariant unobservables. 
It is usual to assume that the unobserved heterogeneity terms (i and  
j) are correlated with the observables (due to student unobserved heterogeneity, teacher 
unobserved heterogeneity and non-random assignment of students to teachers). Thus, 
random effect methods are inconsistent, and fixed effect methods are needed. In this case, 
the coefficients of students and teachers’ time invariant observed characteristics ( and ) 
are not identified separately from the unobserved heterogeneity terms. Given that the 
objective of this paper is to asses the role of such observed teacher characteristics on 
determining student performance, rather than dropping the variables ui and qj, we define: 
 jqj j     (3)
 iui i     (4)
Then, we estimate the models in two steps. In a first step we estimate the following 
equation using fixed effects methods: 
                                                 
1 We discuss modeling issues in more detail in our earlier paper on student achievement in elementary 
school (See Buddin and Zamarro, 2009a). 
2 We also estimated fixed effects levels model assuming 0=0 and a gains model assuming 0=1. We prefer 
the more general model in Eq. 2, because it incorporates a more flexible adjustment for student 
heterogeneity. The teacher effects from the dynamic panel model are similar to those for the more 
restrictive levels and gains models.   
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it it 1 0 it 1 itY  Y +x  i j         (5)
Then, in a second-stage regression we evaluate the ability of a rich set of observable 
teacher qualifications to predict teacher quality (j). Many of the observable teacher 
characteristics considered in this analysis are important determinants of teacher 
recruitment, retention and salaries decisions. In the same manner, we also analyze the 
ability of observable student characteristics to predict the student ability term (i). Causal 
interpretation of the coefficients in these second step regressions would need the 
additional assumptions that Cov(ui, i )=Cov(qj, j)=0. As explained below, this 
assumption is unlikely to be satisfied in this context. Thus, our second step estimates 
should not be interpreted as causal effects but as measures of the correlation between 
observed characteristics and the teacher quality and student ability terms. Finally, our 
dependent variables in these second step regressions are statistical estimates of the true 
measures of teacher quality and student ability (j and i) and as such they are measured 
with error. Thus, to obtain efficient estimates of the parameters we perform Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) regressions where the weights are computed 
following Borjas (1987).  
A practical problem in estimating equations (5) is that there is no straight forward 
algebraic transformation of the observables that allow us estimate these equations and 
easily recover the estimates of the students and teachers’ fixed effects.3 Abowd et al. 
(1999), in an application for employer- employee data, propose to explicitly including 
dummy variables for employer heterogeneity and sweeping out the employee 
heterogeneity algebraically. They proved that this approach gives the same solution as the 
                                                 
3 See Abowd et al (1999) for a description of suitable methods to estimate models with two levels 
fixed effects in the context of linked employer-employee data. 
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Least Squares Dummy Variables estimator for fixed effects panel data models. However, 
this method leads to computational difficulties because the software needs to invert a 
(K+J)×(K+J) matrix and store a lot of information. K refers to the total number of 
explanatory variables while J is the total number of teachers. Thus, we estimate the 
models in equations (5) using a preconditioned conjugate gradient method described in 
Abowd, Creecy & Kramarz (2002).4 Guimaraes and Portugal (2009) proposed an 
alternative approach to estimation using a simple to implement iterative procedure that 
can be easily extended to alternative specifications of the model. 
In addition to previous computational difficulties, estimation of equation (5) has 
the additional complication that taking differences to eliminate the student fixed effects 
will lead to correlation of the differenced lagged score ( it 1 it 2Y Y  ) and the differenced 
error term ( it it-1  ). Anderson and Hsiao (1981) proposed using an instrumental 
variable estimator with it 2Y   as an instrument for ( it 1 it 2Y Y  ). This is a valid method 
since it 2Y   is not correlated with ( it it-1  ), assuming the errors are not serially 
correlated. This is the approach we follow to obtain estimates of equation (5). In 
particular, we follow Guimaraes and Portugal (2009) proposed routine for estimating 
models with high dimensional fixed effects and obtain instrumental variable estimates of 
equation (5) using it 2Y   as instrument.
5  
                                                 
4 Amine Ouazad developed the STATA routine used for the estimation of equation (5). The 
software is available on the web at http://repository.ciser.cornell.edu/viewcvs-
public/cg2/branches/stata/.  
5 An alternative more efficient estimator method uses additional lags of the dependent variable as 
instruments (see Arellano and Bond (1991)). The model is then overidentified, so estimation 
should be by 2SLS or GMM methods. Given to computational difficulties derived from 
combination of these methods with high dimensional fixed effects we are not able to obtain 
estimates using these alternative methods. 
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Other potential data problems include, sample selection and attrition. Sample 
selection is due to the fact that we only observe teachers who passed their licensure 
exams. Although we acknowledge that the results we obtain are not representative for the 
whole population of potential teachers, they are for those teachers who are deemed 
eligible to teach. In this sense, we still believe the estimates we obtain in this population 
are the most relevant ones because these are the teachers who effectively will be 
participating in the educational system. On the other hand, literature suggests that more 
qualified teachers are more likely to leave the profession sooner (See e.g. Goldhaber, 
2007). This phenomenon constitutes another source of potential bias. As a specification 
check, we estimated our models for teachers with less than 6 years of teaching 
experience, and the results did not differ from the ones for the whole sample. As a result, 
only the results corresponding to the complete sample are presented in the next sections. 
Some students dropout of high school, so we observe student test score only for 
high school grades completed by each student. If this sample attrition is due to either 
observed or unobserved time-invariant student characteristics, then the model estimates 
will be consistent (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). As a further check for attrition bias 
associated with dropouts, we reestimated the model using inverse probability weights to 
adjust for the probability of each student dropping out in each year. The weighted 
estimates were similar to the unweighted estimates, and the correlation between teacher 
effects in the two models was over 0.90. As a result, we focus on the unweighted 
estimates in the results section below.  
Data 
 
Student Achievement and Teacher Data 
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As in the rest of the country, California high school students have low graduation 
rates and many graduates are unprepared for college. About 80 percent of high school 
students graduate and 34 percent of graduates meet course requirements for attending a 
California four-year public college.6 Urban high school students fare worse than students 
in suburban and rural schools. About 72 percent of Los Angeles Unified School District 
(LAUSD) high school students graduate and 26 percent of graduates have completed 
college required courses. Within LAUSD, African American and Hispanic students fare 
much worse than white, non-Hispanic students. The graduation rates are 57, 64, and 79 
percent for African American, Hispanic, and white non-Hispanic students, respectively. 
Similarly, 22 percent of African American and Hispanic graduates meet course 
requirements for college as compared with 37 percent of white non-Hispanic students.  
About 85 percent of high schools in LAUSD are Title I schools, since over 40 
percent of their students are from low income families. These schools received special 
categorical funding from the federal government to improve the achievement of 
disadvantaged students. Title I schools are designated at Program Improvement (PI) 
schools if they fail to make adequate yearly progress towards meeting state achievement 
standards for two consecutive years. Under PI, NCLB requires schools to provide various 
options to parents including transfers to other schools, supplemental educational services 
for students, and restructuring. In 2007 (see Figure 3.1), 85 percent of LAUSD high 
                                                 
6 High school dropout rates are difficult to measure, since districts have limited information about whether 
students leaving their district enroll in another district (Swanson, 2008; Greene and Forester, 2003). The 
California dropout rate is based on student-level data using the California Department of Education’s 
statewide student identifier. The new system allows the longitudinal tracking of students from district to 
district in the state and is more accurate than the earlier system were some intrastate transfers were counted 
as dropouts. Without the recent longitudinal tracking, Greene and Forester (2003) had estimated the 
California dropout rate as 33 percent for the public high school class of 2001. 
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schools were Title I schools. Among the Title I schools, half are in Program Improvement 
(PI) status. About 20 percent of Title I schools have been in PI for 5 or more years. 
Table 3.1 describes the characteristics of LAUSD high school students. About 70 
percent of students are Hispanic and 28 percent are English Language Learners (ELLs). 
About 37 percent of Hispanics are ELLs as compared with 7 percent of other students. 
Two-thirds of students come from low income families eligible for free/reduce school 
lunches of the federal government. Parental education levels in the district are also low 
and provide further indication of disadvantages faced by many students in the district. 
Student achievement is measured on the California Standards Test (CST), in 
reading and math. The CST is aligned with state curriculum standards and reflects the 
material covered in the respective high school courses. CST raw scores are normalized by 
grade and year, so our models are based on a continuous linear scale.  
Table 3.2 shows that students and teachers are unevenly spread across schools in 
the district. As in most urban areas, wealth varies across neighborhoods in the districts 
and the composition of neighborhood schools reflects these differences. The table shows 
the student and teacher composition of schools in the bottom and top achievement 
quartile. Schools in the bottom quartile have test scores nearly a standard deviation lower 
than those in the top quartile. Low performing students have large concentrations of 
black, Hispanic, and ELL students. About 51 percent of students in low performing 
schools have parents with less than a high school diploma as compared with only 23 
percent of students in the top quartile. 
The distribution of teacher characteristics also varies substantially between low- 
and high-achievement schools. Teachers in the bottom quartile have less experience than 
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in the top quartile, and they are much more likely to be black or Hispanic. Teacher 
licensure scores are around 0.5 to 0.7 standard deviations lower at low-achievement 
schools than at high-achievement schools. The teacher assignment pattern mirror that 
reported by Lankford et al. (2002) in New York City and substantiates the assertion that 
low-income and at-risk students are often match with teachers with weak qualifications as 
measured by traditional criterion (Murnane and Steele, 2007). 
An important data issue is how schools sort students into classes. If student 
assignments were based on prior achievement or achievement trajectory, then naïve 
measures of teacher effects might be misleading. For example, if a subset of teachers at 
each school consistently received the “best” students (based on their prior ability), then 
these teachers would have a head start for having high-achieving students at the end of 
the year. Two factors minimize the importance of school level sorting. First, student 
achievement scores from spring testing are not available until late summer when class 
assignments are already determined. Second, the dynamic panel data model controls for 
various types of student sorting by controlling for student heterogeneity through prior test 
scores and through student fixed effects. 
We show the extent of student sorting within high schools in Table 3.3. The table 
entries show the mean standard deviation in prior student test scores for each teacher 
under various sorting scenarios. The levels column indicates the average prior test score 
of students for each teacher, and the gains column indicates the average change in test 
score for the prior two years for each teacher. With random sorting, the standard 
deviation for each teacher would be relatively large, because each teacher would have a 
mixture of students with low- and high-prior test scores. Alternatively, with perfect 
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sorting, each teacher would have a relatively homogeneous mix of students, and the 
standard deviation of prior scores would be small. 
The results in Table 3.3 suggest that sorting effects in LAUSD are small.7 The 
observed within school pattern of assignment is much closer to random than perfect 
assignment for all grades in both ELA and math. The gaps between the random and 
observed entries are smaller in math than in reading and much smaller in the gains model 
than in the levels model. The evidence indicates that sorting is not a major issue for 
LAUSD students. 
Teacher Licensure Data 
 The California Commission on Teacher Credentialing (CCTC) requires teachers 
to pass two tests for a secondary-level teaching credential.8 The California Basic 
Educational Skills Test (CBEST) is given to teacher candidates before they enter teacher 
preparation programs. The test measures general aptitude in reading, writing, and math. 
Teaching candidates must also pass the appropriate California Subject Examination for 
Teachers (CSET) test in each subject that they are certified to teach. We focus on 
teachers certified in English and mathematics, since ELA and mathematics are the 
primary subjects tested in California’s student achievement tests.9 
 All teacher candidates must take the general aptitude test. The first-time pass rates 
are 81 percent for white non-Hispanic teaching candidates but only 44 and 53 percent for 
Black and Hispanic candidates (Jacobson and Suckow, 2006). After retesting, the pass 
                                                 
7 Aaronson et al. (2007) and Koedel (2009) use similar measures of student sorting for Chicago and San 
Diego high school districts. They also find small levels of student sorting in their studies. 
8 Le and Buddin (2005) provides more detail on how the tests are constructed and assessed validity 
evidence for the tests. 
9 Students are also tested in other areas like social sciences and sciences, but these tests are not given to 
student in successive grades. We focus on ELA and math, because repeated observations in each subject in 
needed for the value-added approach described above. 
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rates increase substantially, and the race/ethnic gap in pass rates narrows considerably. 
This suggests that many candidates may improve their skills and preparation to meet the 
pass criterion or test familiarity boosts scores. The cumulative pass rates are 93, 69, and 
77 for white non-Hispanics, Blacks, and Hispanics, respectively. Many candidates may 
be discouraged by failing one of the tests, however, and lose interest in teaching. 
 The first-time pass rates on CSET English test are 66 percent for white non-
Hispanics as compared with 36 and 49 percent for black and Hispanic candidates 
(Jacobson and Suckow, 2006). The cumulative rate is about 10 percentage points higher 
for white non-Hispanic and Hispanic candidates, while the cumulative pass rate for 
blacks is 56 percent.  
 The first-time pass rates for math are low, and the cumulative rates are not much 
higher (Jacobson and Suckow, 2006). Initial pass rates are 22, 29, and 44 percent for 
blacks, Hispanics, and white non-Hispanics, respectively. The cumulative rates for each 
group are only about 3 percentage points higher than the initial pass rates. 
 Pass rates on both CBEST and CSET are positively correlated with other 
measures of student skills. The CBEST pass rate for “A” students is nearly 20 percentage 
points higher than for “B” students. Similarly, the CSET English and math pass rates are 
20 percentage points higher for “A” than for “B” students.  
Teacher licensure scores are collected by the CCTC through the teacher 
accreditation process, but they are not available to either school districts or teaching 
candidates. We worked with the California State University Chancellor’s Office to obtain 
licensure tests for seven cohorts of CSU teaching candidates. The file includes licensure 
scores for about 62,000 teaching candidates from 2000 through 2006. Separate scores are 
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recorded on a basic skills test and each subject area test. The file contains information on 
failed exams, so we know whether a teacher needed to retake one or more exams as part 
of the certification process. 
The CSU licensure data are available for around 18 per cent of the LAUSD high 
school teachers. This low match rate reflects two key factors. First, most teachers in the 
district received their certification before 2000 and have been teaching for some time. 
The match rate rises to around 23 percent for teachers in their first three years of 
teaching. Second, CSU only has access for licensure scores for candidates from their 
various campuses and not from the entire state. About 50 percent of California teaching 
certificate completers are affiliated with a CSU campus. We were unable to obtain 
additional licensure information from either the California Commission on Teacher 
Credentialing or other campuses. 
Several different methods were used in the empirical analysis to handle the 
missing information on licensure test scores. In each approach, stage 1 regressions are 
estimated as described above on the entire sample. The adjustment for missing licensure 
data occurs in stage 2 using data on estimated teacher effects in reading and math. 
• Multiple imputation. This approach imputes licensure scores from other teacher 
characteristics and estimated teacher effects in reading and math. Multiple 
datasets are created with different imputed values, and final parameters estimates 
are blended from regressions on each dataset. The methods rely on assumptions 
such as Missing at Random or Missing Completely at Random that are made on 
the conditional distributions of the licensure score variables.10 We are concerned 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Rubin (1996) for a description of Missing at Random and Missing Completely at Random 
assumptions and their application in imputing methods. 
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that this approach is not well suited to our situations where we have large 
proportions of missing variables, and we would rather prefer not to make 
assumptions about their (conditional) distributions. 
• Dropping records with missing teacher data. In this approach, we estimate stage 2 
entirely on matched CSU teachers. The results show whether licensure scores for 
recent CSU teaching graduates are significantly related to student achievement in 
each teacher’s classroom. We are concerned that this approach focuses on the 
CSU sample of young teachers and ignores the other teachers. The broader group 
of teachers would provide more information on how other teacher characteristics 
affect student achievement.  
• Missing dummy variables. A common missing value adjustment consists of 
setting the value of the missing covariate to an arbitrary fixed value (zero) and, 
adding dummy variables for “missings.”   
The main analysis results reported below rely on the missing dummy variable approach. 
We also estimated various models with the missing multiple imputation and “dropped 
records” approaches, and these results were similar to those reported below.  
4. Results 
Distribution of Teacher Quality Across Schools 
 
 A key policy issue is whether “good” teachers are concentrated in a few high 
schools or spread across the district? Table 3.2 showed that nominal teacher 
qualifications differed substantially between low- and high-achieving high schools. What 
is unclear from the table, however, is how those teacher qualifications translate into 
student achievement outcomes in the classroom. If teachers with better qualifications are 
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consistently improving achievement more than other teachers, then student achievement 
changes from year to year should mirror the differences reported in Table 3.2 
 We tested for differences in teacher effects across high schools by comparing 
teacher effects from school to school. If teacher quality was relatively homogeneous 
within schools, then the differences in outcomes across schools after controlling for 
student fixed effects would be larger than the differences across teachers. Alternatively, if 
teacher quality varied substantially within schools, then cross school differences would 
be smaller than across teachers, because low- and high- quality teachers within schools 
would lower the differences across schools. 
 Table 4.1 shows the pattern of fixed effects across students, teachers, and schools, 
based on a simple model that only accounts for grade and year effects. As expected, the 
results show that student-to-student differences are the largest component of effects 
reflecting differences in student background and preparation. The gains models show a 
similar pattern where student effects are much larger than either teacher or school effects.  
The teacher and school effects in Table 4.1 show that high quality teachers are not 
concentrated in a few schools. Deviations in teacher effects are larger than school effects 
across both ELA and math scores in both the levels and gains models. This pattern occurs 
because high quality teachers as measured by either levels or gains are dispersed across 
schools. School fixed effects are smaller than teacher fixed effects, because schools 
include combinations of teachers with differing effects on student outcomes. 
By implication, the results in Table 4.1 suggest that the nominal measures of 
teacher quality that differ widely from school to school may be weak measures of how 
well teachers do in the classroom. We examine this in more detail below, but this simple 
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model hints that difference in teacher effects across schools are smaller than are 
difference in nominal measures of teacher qualifications.  
Estimates of Value-Added Models 
 
 We estimated two versions of the student achievement model in equation (5) for 
student achievement in both ELA and math. The first version focuses on the separate, 
direct effect on student achievement of a teacher in the same subject (e.g., the effect of a 
student’s math teacher on their math achievement). The second version is a joint model 
controlling for both direct and indirect effects of teachers on student achievement (e.g., 
the effect of a student’s math and ELA teacher on their math achievement). The premise 
of the second model is that a good teacher in another subject may have some indirect 
effect on achievement perhaps by improving general student skills or focus on learning. 
 In addition to teacher and student effects, the models also control for the 
composition of each student’s class and student/teacher matches.11 As explained in 
previous sections, the central problem with estimating the effect of these peer and match 
variables is that families may self-select their children into classrooms and schools 
depending on their children ability. Moreover, schools may assign their teachers to a 
given classroom depending on its composition. As a result, these variables are potentially 
endogenous. This is taken into account in our estimates including both student and 
teacher fixed effects allowing for correlation between them and the explanatory 
variables.12  
                                                 
11 The models also contain controls for student grade and year. 
12 Most of the research on peer effects dealt with selection by controlling for observable variables, 
comparing siblings that experienced different schools, examining desegregation programs or estimating 
selection models (Angrist & Lang, 2002).   Other parts of the literature exploit the availability of policy or 
natural experiments to estimate peer effects (Zimmerman, 1999 and Sacerdote, 2000).  Hoxby (2000) 
exploits the variation in adjacent cohorts’ peer composition within a grade within a school that is 
idiosyncratic to estimate peer effects.  Cullen and Jacob (2007) use lottery data to look at open enrollment 
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The results differ somewhat between ELA and math, but they are similar for the 
separate and joint teacher effects models. The results in Table 4.2 show a small positive 
effect of class size on student achievement. Several measures of peer effects are 
statistically significant, but the magnitude of the effects is small. The proportion of girls 
in the class is positively related to ELA achievement and inversely related to math 
achievement. If we increase the proportion of girls from 0.5 to 0.6, we would increase 
individual achievement in ELA by only 0.003 standard deviations and reduce individual 
math achievement by only 0.006 standard deviations. ELA and math achievement is low 
in classes with larger shares of black students. The Hispanic class share generally has no 
significant effect on either type of achievement. Asian composition has no effect on 
reading achievement and a negative effect on math achievement. The proportion of ELLs 
in a class is inversely related to ELA achievement and positively related to math 
achievement.   
Previous research by Dee (2005), Clotfelter et al. (2007), and Ouazad (2007) find 
that students do better academically when they are matched with a teacher of similar 
race/ethnicity or gender. We find that female students do better when matched with 
female teacher—the effect size is less than 0.01 in ELA, but it is five times larger in 
math. Hispanic students do slightly better when taught by a Hispanic math teacher (0.02 
effect size) and slightly worse when taught by a Hispanic ELA teacher (0.01 effect size). 
Black students have math achievement 0.02 standard deviations lower with a black 
teacher and no different ELA achievement. Asian/Pacific Islander students do benefit 
                                                                                                                                                 
effects for Chicago elementary school students.  They find lottery winners are matched with higher quality 
peers in their new schools but their subsequent achievement scores are not higher than those of lottery 
losers.   
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from being matched with a similar teacher in math, where the effect size is about 0.9. We 
hypothesized that higher SES students might benefit more from teachers with more 
education than other students. The results show that students with college parents have 
neither higher nor lower achievement levels when matched with a teacher with a master 
degree or a Ph.D. 
The coefficient on the lagged test score variable is an indication of the persistence 
of ELA and math skills from year to year. The parameter is 0.15 in ELA and 0.39 in 
math. These parameter estimates are significantly different from zero as implied by the 
levels model and from unity as implied by the gains model. The results suggest that a 
dynamic panel data model is preferred to either the levels or gains model. On a practical 
level, however, we found similar estimates for these other models to those reported here. 
 The teacher effects parameters in Table 4.2 show strong teacher effects in both 
ELA and math. In the first model with only ELA teacher effects; a standard deviation in 
teacher effects is associated with a 0.18 standard deviation in ELA achievement. The 
magnitude of this effect falls to 0.17 standard deviations in the second model where we 
also control for indirect effects of the math teacher on ELA achievement. The indirect 
effects of the math teacher are 0.14 standard deviations even after controlling for the 
ELA teacher. We found only a small correlation of 0.04 between the ELA and math 
teacher effects, so the direct and indirect teacher effects are operating independently of 
one another. Also, the small correlation between teacher effects suggests that students are 
not systematically sorted by both types of teachers. 
 Differences in math teacher effects are larger than those for ELA. Looking at the 
math teacher effects separately, we find that a standard deviation change in math teacher 
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quality is associated with a 0.29 standard deviation in math student achievement. This 
effect falls to 0.25 in the joint model. In the joint model, the indirect effect of a standard 
deviation change in the ELA quality distribution is association with a 0.24 effect on math 
achievement. The correlation between the math and ELA teacher effects is 0.17. While 
this correlation is much higher than in ELA achievement, the direct and indirect effects 
are still operating somewhat independently of one another. The surprising result here is 
that the indirect of the ELA teacher on math achievement is almost as large as the direct 
effect of the math teacher on math achievement.  
Teacher Quality and Observed Teacher Characteristics 
 
 Second-stage regressions were used to measure how time-invariant teacher 
characteristics affect student achievement. The teacher effects from the separate and joint 
models were highly correlated, but we estimated separate second-stage models to look for 
possible differences between the two models. The specifications controlled for teacher 
experience, gender, race/ethnicity, education level, and teacher licensure scores. 
 In ELA, the results show that almost none of the variables have a statistically 
significant effect on student achievement in either the separate or joint model. Traditional 
measures of teacher quality like experience and education level do not matter for ELA 
teachers. Similarly, ELA teachers with higher general aptitude or more subject-area 
knowledge have no high student achievement outcomes than other teachers. 
 In math, the results show that experienced math teachers have slightly lower 
achievement gains in their classes than less experienced teachers. Black and Hispanic 
teacher have achievement scores 0.06 and 0.04 standard deviations higher than white 
non-Hispanic teachers in the model with only math teacher effects, but these effects 
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become statistically insignificant in the joint specification. Teacher education level has no 
effect on classroom outcomes. None of the teacher licensure scores has any affect on 
student achievement in math.  
 Finally, we estimated how teacher effects differed across schools in the 
performance quadrants as described in Table 3.2. While measured teacher characteristics 
varied substantially between low- and high-performing schools, we found no statistical 
difference in the teacher effects for these two quadrants. Teacher effects are relatively 
balance across high schools even although the mix of teacher qualifications is 
unbalanced. 
5. Conclusions 
 The results show large differences in high school student achievement from 
teacher to teacher, but these differences are unrelated to measured teacher qualifications 
and background. These results are consistent with our earlier findings for elementary and 
middle school students in LAUSD (Buddin and Zamarro, 2009a; Buddin and Zamarro, 
2009b) where we also found little effect of teacher characteristics on student 
achievement. A key issue for researchers and policymakers is to identify why some 
teachers are much more effective than others.  
 
How does the distribution of teacher quality vary across high schools?  
 
 Teacher experience, education level, and licensure scores vary considerably 
between low- and high-achieving high schools. Disadvantaged students are concentrated 
in low-performing schools and are generally taught by teachers with lower measured 
quality than students in more affluent areas.  
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Measured teacher attributes like experience, education level, and licensure scores 
are largely unrelated to student achievement in the classroom, however. Many teachers in 
low-performing schools have student achievement gains comparable to those of teachers 
in high-performing schools. In terms of student outcomes, teacher quality is much more 
balanced across high schools than are the measured qualifications of teachers.   
 
How important are traditional measures of teacher quality like experience and 
educational level in predicting high school student achievement?  
 
 We find that teacher experience and education level are largely unrelated to high 
school student achievement. We do find evidence that more experienced math teachers 
have slightly worse student outcomes than new math teachers.  
 Our results imply that incentives to improve the traditional qualifications of 
teachers at low-performing high schools are unlikely to improve educational outcomes at 
those schools.  
 
Are teachers with higher general aptitude or more subject-matter expertise, as measured 
on teacher licensure tests, more successful improving student achievement than other 
teachers? 
 
 We find than neither general aptitude nor subject area knowledge of teachers has 
any effect on high school student achievement in the classroom. The California licensure 
tests include content that is consistent with the job of teaching, and the cut scores are 
derived in a defensible manner (Le and Buddin, 2005). While the tests do screen some 
teaching applicants from obtaining teaching certificates, the scores themselves do not 
predict how well individual teachers will perform in the classroom. 
 A caveat to our licensure results is that we are unable to measure how well 
teachers who fail the licensure tests would have done in the classroom. Perhaps 
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candidates with lower general aptitude or subject area knowledge would have performed 
worse in the classroom than teachers that did pass the exams. Nonetheless, our results 
suggest that increasing the California licensure cut scores would do nothing to improve 
student achievement of high school students. 
Perhaps states should rethink licensure tests and build measures of teacher skills 
that are better predictors of student achievement in the classroom. Different standards 
might restrict entry into the teacher profession, however, and have adverse consequences 
for teacher supply (Angriest and Ugrian, 2003).   
 
Does ELA instruction spill over into math and visa versa?  
 We find that high quality teachers have important indirect effects on student 
achievement beyond their immediate subject area. The quality of the ELA teacher affects 
math student achievement even after controlling for the direct effects of the math 
teachers. Similarly, high quality math instruction improves the ELA achievement of high 
school students after controlling for the direct effects of the ELA teacher. The spillover 
effects suggest that teaching quality may have a broader effect on student enthusiasm or 
engagement that extends beyond one class and more broadly improves student 
achievement outcomes.  
 
 A final issue is the context for measuring teacher effectiveness. LAUSD, like 
most districts, bases teacher compensation on inputs like teacher experience and 
educational level. By California statute, teacher assessments do not include student test 
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results, and teachers are not directly rewarded for improving student achievement.13  
Since the current compensation system rewards teacher inputs and not teacher output, 
teachers may have insufficient incentives to consistently provide their “best” effort in 
improving student achievement. Perhaps more experienced or more knowledgeable 
teachers could perform better than other teachers, but the current compensation scheme 
does not sufficiently reward the extra effort. 
                                                 
13 The Obama Administration is pressuring California and other states to use student achievement results in 
teacher assessments. California and other states may revise their practices for reviewing teacher 




Aaronson, D., Barrow, L., Sander, W., 2007. Teachers and Student Achievement in the 
Chicago Public High Schools, Journal of Labor Economics, 25(1), 95-135. 
 
Abowd, J., Creecy, R., Kramarz, F., 2002, “Computing Person and Firm Effects Using 
Linked Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data,” Cornell University Working Paper. 
 
Abowd, J., Kramarz, F., Margolis, D., 1999. High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms, 
Econometrica, 67 (2), 251-333. 
 
Anderson, T.W., Hsiao, C., 1981. Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error 
Components, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 76, 598-606. 
 
Angrist, J., Guryan, J., 2003. Does Teacher Testing Raise Teacher Quality? Evidence 
from State Certification Requirements, NBER working paper 9545. 
 
Angrist, J., Lang, K., 2002. How Important Are Classroom Peer Effects? Evidence from 
Boston’s Metco Program, NBER working Paper 9263. 
 
Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations, Review of Economic Studies, 58, 
277-298. 
 
Borjas, G., 1987.  Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants, American Economic 
Review, 77(4), 531-553. 
 
Boyd D., P. Grossman, H. Lankford, S. Loeb & J. Wyckoff (2006). “How changes in 
entry requirements alter the teacher workforce and affect student achievement,” 
Education Finance and Policy, 1(2), 176-216. 
 
Buddin, R., McCaffrey, D., Kirby, S., Xia, N., 2007. Merit Pay for Florida Teachers: 
Design and Implementation Issues, Working paper, RAND WR-508-FEA. 
 
Buddin, R., Zamarro, G., 2009a. Teacher Qualifications and Student Achievement in 
Urban Elementary Schools, Journal of Urban Economics, 66, 103-115. 
 
Buddin, R., Zamarro, G., 2009b. Teacher Qualifications and Middle School Student 
Achievement, RAND Corporation, WR-671-IES.  Available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR671/. 
 
Clotfelter, C., Ladd, H., Vigdor, J., 2007. How and Why Do Teacher Credentials Matter 
for Student Achievement? NBER Working Paper 12828. 
 
Clotfelter, C., Ladd, H., Vigdor, J., 2008. Teacher Credentials and Student Achievement 
in High School: A Cross-Subject Analysis with Student Fixed Effects, NBER Working 
Paper No. 13617. 
  30
 
Corneliβen, T., 2006. Using Stata for a Memory Saving Fixed Effects Estimation of the 
Three-way Error Component Model, Working paper, FDZ Methodenreport nr. 3. 
 
Cullen, J., Jacob, B., 2007. Is Gaining Access to Selective Elementary Schools Gaining 
Ground? Evidence from Randomized Lotteries, NBER Working Paper 13443. 
 
Dee, T., 2005. A Teacher Like Me: Does Race, Ethnicity, or Gender Matter? American 
Economic Review, 95(2), 558-565 
 
Ehrenberg, R., Brewer, D., 1995. Did teachers’ verbal ability and race matter in the 
1960’s? Coleman revisited, Economics of Education Review, 141, 1-21. 
 
Felch, J., Song, J., 2009. Schwarzenegger’s Plan Would Reshape Education in California, 
Los Angeles Times, August 21, 2009.  
 
Ferguson, R. 1991. Paying for public education: New evidence on how and why money 
matters, Harvard Journal on Legislation, 282, 465-498. 
 
Ferguson, R., Ladd, H. 1996. How and why money matters: An analysis of Alabama 
schools, In H.Ladd (Ed.), Holding schools accountable: Performance-based reform in 
education, 265-298. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. 
 
Goldhaber, D., 2007. Everyone’s Doing It, But What Does Teacher Testing Tell Us 
About Teacher Effectiveness? Journal of Human Resources, 42(4), 765-794. 
 
Greene, J. P. & Forster, G. 2003. Public High School Graduation and College Readiness 
Rates in the United States, Manhattan Institute Education Working Paper 3. 
 
Hanushek, E., 1986. The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public 
Schools, Journal of Economic Literature, 24(4), 1141-1177. 
 
Harris, D., Sass, T., 2006. The Effects of Teacher Training on Teacher Value-Added, 
Working paper, Florida State University. 
 
Hoxby, C. 2000. Peer effects in the classroom: Learning from gender and race variation. 
Working Paper 7867, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Jacob, B., Lefgren, L., 2008. Can Principals Identify Effective Teachers? Evidence on 
Subjective Performance Evaluation in Education, Journal of Labor Economics, 26(1), pp. 
101-136. 
 
Jacobson, P., Suckow, M., 2006. Report on Passing Rates of Commission-Approved 
Exams For 2000-01 to 2004-05, California Commission on Teacher Credentialing. 
 
  31
Kane, T. J., J. E. Rockoff and D. O. Staiger 2008. What Does Certification Tell Us About 
Teacher Effectiveness? Evidence from New York City. Economics of Education Review, 
27, 615-631. 
 
Kahne, J.E., Sporte, S.E., de la Torre, M., & Easton, J.K., 2008. Small High Schools on a 
Larger Scale: The Impact of School Conversions in Chicago, Educational Evaluation and 
Policy Analysis, 30, 281-315. 
 
Koedel, C., 2009.An Empirical Analysis of Teacher Spillover Effects in Secondary 
School, Economics of Education Review.  
 
Koedel, C., Betts, J., 2007. Re-Examining the Role of Teacher Quality in the Educational 
Production Function, Working paper, University of California, San Diego. 
 
Kramarz, F., Machin, S., Ouazad, A., 2007. What Makes a Test Score? Pupils, Schools 
and Peers in Achievement in English Primary Education, Working paper. 
 
Lankford, H., Loeb, S., & Wycoff, J. 2002. Teacher Sorting and the Plight of Urban 
Schools: A Descriptive Analysis, Education Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Spring 
2002, 24(1), 37-62. 
 
Lazear, E., 1986. Salaries and Piece Rates, Journal of Business, 59(3), 405-31. 
 
Lazear, E., 2000. Performance Pay and Productivity, American Economic Review, 93(5), 
1346-61. 
 
Le, V., Buddin, R., 2005., Examining the Validity Evidence for California Teacher 
Licensure Exams, Working paper, RAND WR-334-EDU. 
 
Martorell, Paco & Isaac McFarlin, Jr. 2007. Help or Hindrance? The Effects of College 
Remediation on Academic and Labor Market Outcomes, unpublished working paper.  
 
Murnane, R. & Steele, J., 2008. What Is the Problem? The Challenge of Providing 
Effective Teachers for All Children, Project Muse, 17(1), 15-43. 
 
National Center for Education Statistics, 2007. National Assessment of Educational 
Progress: 12th Grade Reading and Mathematics 2005, NCES 2007-468. 
 
National Council on Teacher Quality, 2004. Increasing the Odds: How Good Policies 
Can Yield Better Teachers. 
 
Ouazad, A. 2007. Assessed by a Teacher Like Me: Race, Gender and Subjective 
Evaluations, Working paper, London School of Economics. 
 
Rivkin, S., Hanushek, E., Kain, J., 2005. Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement, 
Econometrica, 73(2), 417-458. 
  32
 
Rowan, B., Chaing, F., Miller, R.J., 1997. Using research on employees’ performance to 
study the effects of teachers on students’ achievement, Sociology of Education, 704, 256-
284. 
 
Rowan, B., Correnti R., Miller, R. J. 2002. What large-scale research tells us about 
teacher effects on student achievement: Insights from the Prospects study of elementary 
schools, Teachers College Record, 104(8), 1525-1567. 
 
Rubin, D., 1996. Multiple Imputation after 18+ Years, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 91, 473-489. 
 
Sacerdote, B., 2001. Peer effects with random assignment: Results for Dartmouth 
roommates, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 681–704. 
 
Steele, J., 2008. Do Financial Incentives Help Low-Performing Schools Attract and Keep 
Academically Talented Teachers? Evidence from California, Working paper, Harvard 
University. 
 
Strauss, R., Sawyer, E., 1986. Some New Evidence on Teacher and Student 
Competencies, Economics of Education Review, 5(1), 41-48. 
 
Swanson, C., 2008. Crisis in Cities: A Special Analytic Report on High School 
Graduation, Editorial Projects in Education Research Center. 
 
Todd, P., Wolpin, K., 2003. On the Specification and Estimation of the Production 
Function for Cognitive Achievement, Economic Journal, 113, F3-F33. 
 
Cameron, C., Trevidi, P., 2005. Microeconomics: Methods and Applications, New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Venezia, A., Kirst, M., & Antonio, A. 2003. Betraying the College Dream: How 
Disconnected K-12 and Postsecondary Education Systems Undermine Student 
Aspirations. Stanford University Bridge Project Final Report. Available at 
www.stanford.edu/group/bridgeproject/betrayingthecollegedream.pdf. 
 
Wright, S., Horn, S., Sanders, W. 1997. Teacher and classroom context effects on student 
achievement: Implications for teacher evaluation, Journal of Personnel Evaluation in 
Education, 11, 57–67. 
 
Zimmerman, D. 1999. Peer effects in academic outcomes: Evidence from a natural 














































Figure 3.1—Program Improvement Status for LAUSD High Schools in 2007 
 




Asian/Pacific Islander 0.07 
Female 0.49 
English Language Learner 0.28 
Free/reduced lunch 0.66 
Highest Parental Education  
Not high school graduate 0.35 
High school diploma 0.24 
Some college 0.16 
College graduate 0.19 




Table 3.2--Comparison of Student and Teacher Characteristics 








Enrollment (grades 9 through 11)       2061       1746 
 
Student Characteristics 
ELA (Standardized) -0.47 0.50 
Math (Standardized) -0.61 0.33 
Black 0.22 0.11 
Hispanic 0.77 0.54 
English Language Learner 0.36 0.14 
Parents Not High School Graduates 0.51 0.23 
 
ELA & Math Teacher Characteristics 
Experience 6.81 10.78 
Black 0.30 0.09 
Hispanic 0.22 0.15 
Master's/Doctorate 0.32 0.35 
General Aptitude (Standardized) -0.10 0.39 
ELA Subject Matter Knowledge (Standardized) -0.30 0.28 
Math Subject Matter Knowledge (Standardized) -0.22 0.54 
 
 
Table 3.3. Mean Standard Deviation of Incoming  
Student Test Scores by Teacher 
 ELA Math 
 Level Gain Level Gain 
9th Grade     
Random Sorting 0.89 0.57 0.99 0.75 
Observed 0.76 0.57 0.90 0.74 
Perfect Sorting 0.20 0.16 0.29 0.27 
     
10th Grade     
Random Sorting 0.89 0.60 0.91 0.88 
Observed 0.73 0.60 0.81 0.84 
Perfect Sorting 0.20 0.18 0.27 0.28 
     
11th Grade     
Random Sorting 0.86 0.58 0.80 0.82 
Observed 0.70 0.58 0.68 0.79 
Perfect Sorting 0.29 0.17 0.25 0.26 
Notes: Entries are based on standardized test 
scores by teacher within each school. 
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Table 4.1—Comparison of Student, Teacher, and School Fixed Effects 
 Levels Gains 
 ELA Math ELA Math 
#1.  Student & Teacher Fixed Effects     
Student (Student) 0.93 0.85 0.47 0.58 
Teacher (Teacher) 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.24 
#2.  Student & School Fixed Effects     
Student (Student) 0.94 0.84 0.46 0.56 
School (School) 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.14 
 
Table 4.2. Effects of Class Characteristics and Student/Teacher Match on High School 
Student Achievement with Student and Teacher Fixed Effects 
 ELA Achievement Math Achievement 
 ELA Only ELA & Math Math Only Math & ELA 
Lagged Test Score   0.1528* 0.1575* 0.4365* 0.3896* 
 (0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0089) (0.0087) 
Class Size 0.0012* 0.0012* 0.0011* 0.0010* 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Proportion Female in Class 0.0337* 0.0334* -0.0594* -0.0630* 
 (0.0088) (0.0080) (0.0180) (0.0140) 
Proportion Black in Class -0.0543* -0.0541* -0.0886* -0.0751* 
 (0.0131) (0.0139) (0.0327) (0.0319) 
Proportion Hispanic in Class -0.0156 -0.0167 -0.0482* -0.0335 
 (0.0102) (0.0091) (0.0244) (0.0252) 
Proportion Asian/Pacific Islander in Class -0.0104 -0.0104 -0.3171* -0.2984* 
 (0.0150) (0.0130) (0.0430) (0.0334) 
Proportion ELL in Class   -0.0344* -0.0346* 0.0136 0.0257* 
 (0.0048) (0.0040) (0.0098) (0.0086) 
Hispanic Student & Teacher -0.0077* -0.0079* 0.0186* 0.0167* 
 (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0065) (0.0052) 
Black Student & Teacher 0.0118 0.0117 -0.0270* -0.0279* 
 (0.0067) (0.0061) (0.0111) (0.0092) 
Asian/Pacific Islander Student & Teacher -0.0166 -0.0173 0.0981* 0.0913* 
 (0.0120) (0.0090) (0.0181) (0.0145) 
Female Student & Teacher 0.0073* 0.0075* 0.0547* 0.0514* 
 (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0043) (0.0040) 
College Parents & Teacher Masters/Ph.D. 0.0042 0.0045 0.0110 0.0095 
 (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0075) (0.0094) 
Constant -0.0591* -0.0046* -0.1515* -0.0003 
 (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0070) (0.0041) 
Math  0.1391 0.2881 0.2507 
ELA 0.1822 0.1710  0.2446 
 0.6520 0.6410 1.0701 1.0253 
Math  0.0471 0.0725 0.0594 
ELA 0.0781 0.0693  0.0569 
R-Squared 0.0017 0.0187 0.1172 0.1296 
N 457385 457385 435608 435608 
* p<0.05 
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Table 4.3. Effects of Teacher Qualifications on High School Student Achievement 
 ELA Achievement Math Achievement 
 ELA Only ELA & Math Math Only Math & ELA 
Experience 0.0017 0.0015 -0.0091* -0.0057* 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0018) 
Experience Squared -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female 0.0029 0.0039 0.0028 0.0116 
 (0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0125) (0.0098) 
Black/African American -0.0124 -0.0053 0.0604* 0.0218 
 (0.0103) (0.0096) (0.0189) (0.0150) 
Hispanic 0.0199* 0.0118 0.0378* 0.0075 
 (0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0160) (0.0125) 
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.0146 0.0124 0.0077 0.0032 
 (0.0128) (0.0120) (0.0169) (0.0131) 
Masters -0.0018 -0.0061 0.0144 0.0156 
 (0.0074) (0.0070) (0.0150) (0.0118) 
Ph.D. -0.0074 -0.0034 -0.0166 0.0033 
 (0.0196) (0.0184) (0.0389) (0.0301) 
General Aptitude Score -0.0084 -0.0043 -0.0211 -0.0165 
 (0.0090) (0.0084) (0.0161) (0.0127) 
English Score 0.0020 0.0002   
 (0.0176) (0.0165)   
Math Score   -0.0229 -0.0190 
   (0.0302) (0.0234) 
Constant -0.0809 -0.0828 -0.0958 -0.0362 
 (0.0638) (0.0599) (0.1151) (0.0903) 
R-Squared 0.0019 -0.0007 0.0360 0.0185 
N 3164 3164 2017 2017 
   * p<0.05 
